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Rotor replacement

As always, ultimate outcomes of the US defense budget remain subject to Congressional wheeling and dealing. New York State representatives vow to fight for their canceled Presidential helicopter replacement even though full operational capability would cost more than twice what was planned and occur more than five years late. Congress has yet to examine Defense Secretary Gates’ decision to cancel the Air Force Combat Search And Rescue helicopter in favor of a vague Joint-Service solution. No alternative acquisition strategy has been suggested for the Army’s badly needed Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter. (With Americans in combat, the latter two replacement fleets are clearly more important than the bloated Presidential barge.) Individually, the three failed programs indeed leave holes in US rotary wing capabilities, but more important to long-term US military power and economic competitiveness are greater investments in rotorcraft Research Development Test and Evaluation (RDT&E).

In what was the ‘global war on terror’, helicopters remain, arguably, the most relevant form of airpower. They move people and supplies, hunt insurgents in crowded cities and desolate mountains, and provide resupply and rescue under fire. With the notable exception of the V-22 Osprey, the replacements for those hard-working helicopters are no faster, longer ranged, or more ballistically tolerant. Important improvements will be made in fire control, pilotage, and communications, but the US government has no flying testbed for a true next-generation rotorcraft. The Sikorsky X2 coaxial rigid rotor demonstrator is a modest, company-funded effort. The Piasecki X-49 Speed Hawk has no promise of Phase II development funding.

US rotorcraft science and technology investments in propulsion, structures, and flight controls are aimed largely at Joint Heavy Lift or Joint Future Theater Lift (JHL/JFTL) concepts that may see an X-plane fly in 2016 or 2017, if the Air Force agrees with the Army that the next strategic airlifter should take off and land vertically. The JHL/JFTL model was designed around the future combat systems vehicle canceled by Defense Secretary Gates – a heavier, better-protected vehicle changes the JHL/JFTL equations and raises new questions about a big, expensive rotorcraft built to carry one vehicle at a time into battle. A less ambitious goal with broader sales appeal might be a scalable joint multirole rotorcraft suitable for combat SAR, scout/attack, and utility missions.

Money drives such concepts. The US Navy will spend five times as much this year on fixed wing RDT&E as on rotary wing programs. The new Naval Center for Rotorcraft Advancement (NACRA) was formed to redress the disparity. Likewise, the Congressional Rotorcraft Caucus has made first legislative steps toward a joint-service rotorcraft programs office in the US Department of Defense to pool resources and requirements. One good, concrete focus for these efforts could be an investment in a high-speed rotorcraft demonstrator, be it an X-49 Phase II or X2 to see if either innovative propulsion concept pays off. Another worthwhile program might be an optimized V-22 free of the compromises imposed by amphibious assault ships. Alternatively, an unmanned high-speed demonstrator could be based on the Bell Eagle Eye tilt rotor. The US Army chose not to keep flying the canceled Comanche as a technology testbed. A new flying testbed funded jointly by government and industry could answer important questions and open markets for a new family of rotorcraft.

Frank Colucci has written about the rotorcraft industry for more than 30 years and is a contributing editor to Aerospace Testing, AHS Vertiflite, and other industry publications.
 

 

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